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Abstract
This paper presents two ‘non-welfarist’ approaches and one ‘wel-
farist’ approach to decompose changes in inequality and social welfare
into three components: population, tax policy and labour supply ef-
fects. As an illustration, changes in inequality and in values of a
social welfare function in Australia between 2001 and 2006 are exam-
ined. Inequality is first defined in non-welfarist terms as a function of
disposable income: the independent judge places no value on leisure.
Then this is modified to allow for evaluations using a weighted geo-
metric mean of disposable income and leisure. This is seen to modify
the evaluation of changes in important ways. Furthermore, the results
are shown to be quite different from those obtained using a ‘welfarist’
evaluation in terms of money metric utility, where separate behav-
ioural effects cannot be isolated.
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1 Introduction
In evaluating changes in inequality or poverty, it is desirable to distinguish
the effects of policy changes in the direct tax and transfer system, from those
arising from changes in the structure of the population. Such population
effects cover a wide range, including changes in the age, occupational, ed-
ucational and demographic structure. Given cross-sectional survey data for
two years, marking the start and end of the period under investigation, it is
possible to compute a range of ‘marginal effects’ for each factor of interest.
For example, the population structure can be held constant, at the first and
last year in turn, and the tax system can be varied. As no particular ceteris
paribus condition is preferred to another, it can be argued on the grounds of
symmetry that an appropriate measure of the effect of the factor is obtained
by averaging over all possible marginal effects.1
This type of approach has been formalised by Shorrocks (2012), who
showed that it is analogous to the Shapley (1953) value of an -person co-
operative game, and its properties were examined by Chantreuil and Trannoy
(2012): both papers were first issued as working papers in 1999, as explained
by Lambert (2012). It was applied by Shorrocks and Kolenikov (2001) to
changes in poverty over time, and adapted by Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005)
to produce a spacial decomposition of poverty in Russia. The static decom-
position has been used by Deutsch et al. (2006) to examine occupational seg-
regation. Gunatilaka and Chotikapanich (2006) examined inequality trends
in Sri Lanka using the approach with a regression-based model. The Shap-
ley value decomposition approach has been used by Pignataro (2010) in the
context of equality of opportunity. Hyslop and Maré (2005) provide a Shap-
ley decomposition of inequality changes in New Zealand by using sample
reweighting, income rescaling and the semi-parametric technique developped
by DiNardo et al. (1996). On the decomposition, see also Sastre and Trannoy
(2002), Cowell and Fiorio (2011) and Charpentier and Mussard (2011).
Few empirical studies have so far been made using behavioural tax mi-
1With  factors, the effect of each factor is thus the average marginal contribution over
!ceterus paribus comparisons.
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crosimulation models. An analysis of changes in Gini inequality measures of
disposable incomes for a number of European countries was made by Bargain
and Callan (2010).2 Their analysis did not allow for labour supply responses
to tax changes, but the approach was extended by Bargain (2010) to decom-
pose changes in disposable incomes in the UK into population, tax structure
and labour supply effects.3 A behavioural tax microsimulation model is par-
ticularly useful for this type of decomposition, since it is able to provide
information about the simulated labour supply (and the corresponding net
incomes) of individuals in a range of counterfactual situations. A tax policy
change designed to influence the distribution of net income may, for exam-
ple, be frustrated by endogenous labour supply responses. Alternatively a
tax change may be made in an attempt to influence labour supply, and it
is important to be able to distinguish those changes from the redistributive
effect of the tax structure alone. Bargain used a structural discrete hours
approach to model labour supply. The random component of utility used
in the specification of preferences means that a probability distribution over
available hours of work is generated for each individual, and Bargain based
disposable incomes for each case on the arithmetic mean hours for each in-
dividual.
The present paper extends earlier analyses to consider alternative wel-
fare metrics which, unlike disposable income, allow for leisure. Disposable
income may be said to involve a ‘non-welfarist’ approach; that is, evaluations
are made in terms of a ‘welfare metric’ which is not expressed in terms of each
individual’s utility.4 The evaluation (made by a disinterested judge whose
value judgements are summarised by the social welfare function implicit in
the inequality measure) does not place any value on leisure consumed by in-
dividuals. Going beyond the ‘non-welfarist’ approach is not straightforward
given the fundamental difficulty arising from the need to specify a suitable
2The working paper on which their article was based first appeared in 2007.
3Any change in inequality resulting from a ‘growth effect’ (an equal proportional change
in incomes and all tax and benefit thresholds) was found to be negligible. This property
is discussed further below.
4On non-welfarist evaluations see, for example, Kaplow and Shavell (2001), who show
that they can violate the Pareto Principle. Kanbur et al. (2004) provide a broad treatment
of non-welfarist objects in the context of optimal taxation.
3
welfare metric. For example, in the basic optimal tax model, the specifica-
tion of a suitable ‘welfarist’ welfare metric is straightforward given the choice
of cardinalisation of utility.5 This is because the basic model assumes that
individuals have the same preferences over net income and leisure, but have
different income-earning abilities. However, a primary advantage of applied
behavioural tax microsimulation models is that they can deal with the con-
siderable heterogeneity of preferences among households which vary in size
and composition. Theoretical work by public choice and welfare theorists
on understanding interpersonal comparability problems and the aggregation
problems involved in evaluating alternative structures, along with the condi-
tions under which price-independent welfare comparisons can be made, has
shown that heterogeneous preferences present serious difficulties; see, for ex-
ample, Donaldson (1992) and Blackorby et al. (1993).
One approach has recently been suggested by Aaberge and Colombino
(2008) and Ericson and Flood (2009).6 Both studies use a discrete hours
structural approach to modelling labour supply, allowing for a substantial
amount of population heterogeneity. However, the welfare metric used in
their social welfare function is a value of utility based on an independently
estimated utility function (expressed in terms of disposable income and hours
of work) which is considered to be the same for all individuals; they regard
it as a common utility function.7 This may be viewed as ‘welfarist’, using a
different utility function for the welfare metric compared with that used to
obtain labour supply.
An extension proposed here involves using, instead of a common (and sep-
arately estimated) ‘utility’ function, a weighting function in a non-welfarist
approach that gives some weight to hours of work as well as disposable in-
5However, the optimal tax rate clearly depends on the cardinalisation of utility used in
the social welfare function.
6For further explanation and discussion, see Decoster and Haan (2010). They compare
alternative welfare metrics based on the use of various nested sets based on a ‘real wage’
metric, a ‘reference wage’ metric, and a ‘Rente criterion’ (based on net income intercepts
of indifference curves).
7Blundell and Shephard (2009) adopt a social welfare function based on a common
(isoelastic) utility transformation. They simplify the resulting expression for the aggre-
gate, allowing for the stochastic utility component, which follows a Type-I extreme value
distribution.
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come. The present paper thus examines the use of social welfare expressed as
a function of individuals’ net income and leisure, using the same weighting
function for all individuals.
The present paper also investigates the use of a decomposition based on
‘money metric utility’ (taking the initial tax structure and wage rates as giv-
ing the required ‘reference prices’). This is therefore a ‘welfarist’ approach.
A modification to the decomposition method is needed because, in this case,
separate behavioural and tax policy effects cannot be distinguished. It must
nevertheless be recognised that the problems, alluded to above, of aggregat-
ing heterogeneous preferences suggest that a cardinalisation of utility based
on money metric utility is unlikely to satisfy the strong conditions explored
by Blackorby et al. (1993). While these difficulties are recognised, it is also
the case that, as Donaldson (1992, p. 89) stressed, ‘no methodology in ap-
plied welfare economics is perfect. Practical work is always limited by the
availability of data and the problem of estimating the economic consequences
of projects. Different evaluation procedures are, therefore, bound to be dif-
ferentially useful in different situations’. It is suggested that comparisons of
alternative metrics are therefore worthwhile.
A feature of the decompositions examined here is that, instead of basing
welfare metrics on each individual’s expected hours of work, they use the
‘pseudo distribution’ method proposed by Creedy et al. (2006) to obtain a
close approximation of the full distribution. Using Monte Carlo methods,
Creedy et al. (2006) found that their method was superior to the use of
arithmetic mean hours in obtaining inequality and poverty measures.8
Section 2 explains the decomposition method used to examine disposable
incomes. This clarification is necessary as much care is needed in setting out
the notation and alternative counterfactual cases. Section 3 reports empirical
results for Australia. Section 4 proposes a method of carrying out the de-
composition using a social welfare function based on both disposable income
and leisure. Results comparable with those of section 3 are reported. Section
8Bargain (2010, p. 8) suggested that ‘averaging individual supply responses over a
large number of draws provides robust transition matrices’. However, the limitations of
using the average for transition matrices are examined by Duncan and Weeks (1998).
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5 explores the use of money metric utility in a social welfare function. For
each application, the simulation model used is the Melbourne Institute Tax
and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), which is described briefly in Appendix A.
Conclusions are in section 6.
2 Decomposition of Disposable Income Changes
Suppose that data are available for two periods, 0 and 1, and it is required to
decompose changes in an index of inequality. Disposable (net of direct taxes
and transfers) income is used as the ‘welfare metric’. For convenience, in this
section the decomposition is discussed in terms of an inequality index. How-
ever, the same approach can be applied to measures of poverty, or values of a
specified social welfare function. As explained in the empirical applications
below, it is combined with an assumption of equal sharing within households
and use of an adult equivalence scale. Let () denote the index of interest,
calculated under tax structure . The tax and transfer system (hereafter ab-
breviated to tax structure) is summarised by a set of parameters, including
the tax rates and thresholds as well as the level of the transfer payments and
their corresponding eligibility rules. In the following analysis the vector of
thresholds for period 0 is always assumed to be adjusted in nominal terms
to period 1 values, using an ‘uprating’ factor.
The values of disposable income are based on a population matrix, ,
such that each row contains relevant information about each individual (in-
cluding endogenous labour supply) under the tax regime operating in period
 and for the population dataset of period . Again, in what follows, 0
values are assumed to be uprated to year 1 nominal values, using the same
uprating factor as that used to obtain the corresponding tax threshold val-
ues.9
9Bargain (2010) introduced the uprating factor explicitly, along with a vector of tax and
transfer thresholds. However, the notation is clearer once it is recognised that parameters
and disposable incomes are always uprated to the final year using a common uprating
factor.
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The inequality measure can thus be written as:
 () (1)
Importantly,  and  need not necessarily be the same. This means that
gross income, , is calculated using the labour supply arising from tax
structure  for dataset . This gross income is rescaled (if necessary) so that
it is expressed in year 1 values. Then the tax structure  is applied to those
gross incomes in order to obtain a set of disposable incomes. The inequality
measure is then computed as a function of the resulting disposable incomes.
The assumption is used throughout that the values of  are ‘scale in-
variant’. That is, the index based on the tax structure in period 0 using
unadjusted tax thresholds and transfer payments and the unadjusted values
of 00, gives exactly the same value as 0 (00), given that the thresholds,
transfer payments and incomes are adjusted using the same factor.10 Hence
the change in the index can be measured by:
∆ =1 (11)−0 (00) (2)
The populations of periods 0 and 1 are clearly different, reflecting for
example differences in demographic, occupational, skill and taste character-
istics. Individuals’ labour supplies for a given population under the actual
tax structure operating in that period are clearly observable, but a range of
hypothetical distributions, and thus indexes, can be generated. For example,
the predicted labour supply in period 0 of each individual in the period 1
population can be obtained ‘as if’ the tax regime of period 0 were to exist
in period 1. This kind of counterfactual enables the change in (2) to be
decomposed as follows.
The change in inequality can be divided into the three distinct effects
mentioned above (since the assumption of homogeneity rules out any simple
‘growth effect’). These reflect labour supply effects of the tax changes; those
arising from the changing structure of the population itself between the two
periods; and finally the change arising from the change in the tax structure.
10In practice this property is likely to hold very closely, and it could not be rejected in
the Australian case examined in the following section.
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In each case, there are several ways to obtain the ceteris paribus requirement,
but these need to follow a particular sequence to ensure that the sum of the
components adds to the total difference in (2).
Consider the contribution to ∆ due to the labour supply adjustment
to tax policy changes. This is reflected in the change in the index,  ,
that is attributed to changes in gross incomes arising from labour supply
changes alone. It may be evaluated using different populations (datasets)
and different tax regimes. Hence the behavioural change is given by:
 = (1)− (0) (3)
for  = 0 1 and  = 0 1. The two terms in this expression differ only in the
tax structure used to obtain labour supply. The combination of different tax
regimes used to compute the index and different datasets to obtain labour
supplies means that there are four terms describing behavioural contributions
to the overall change. These are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Behavioural Effects: B
Labour supply Tax regime of:
based on survey: Year 0 Year 1
Year 0 0 (10)−0 (00) 1 (10)−1 (00)
Year 1 0 (11)−0 (01) 1 (11)−1 (01)
Similarly, the contribution to the overall change in inequality contributed
by the change in the structure of the population is measured by a change in
which the only thing to vary is the population dataset. Hence these effects
are given by:
 = (1)− (0) (4)
for  = 0 1 and basing the gross incomes on the labour supply under the tax
structure, , such that where  denotes the population dataset,  = 1 when
 = 0 and  = 0 when  = 1. This particular configuration of subscripts
relating to the tax structures used is necessary to ensure that when the
population effects are combined with the behavioural effects, the appropriate
terms cancel (so that the sum of the three effects is equal to total changes
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∆). The two-by-two matrix of four population effects corresponding, cell by
cell, to the behavioural effects is given in Table 2.
Table 2: Other (Population) Effects: P
Labour supply Tax regime of:
based on survey: Year 0 Year 1
Year 0 0 (11)−0 (10) 1 (11)−1 (10)
Year 1 0 (01)−0 (00) 1 (01)−1 (00)
When examining the contribution attributed to policy changes in the tax
regime alone, the disposable incomes are based either on the tax regime 0
or 1, using its corresponding population dataset. Only two ceteris paribus
changes are relevant here. Hence the tax policy change effects,  are given
in Table 3.
Table 3: Tax Structure (Policy) Effects: T
Tax regime of:
Year 0 Year 1
1 (11)−0 (11) 1 (00)−0 (00)
The four decompositions are thus, for  = 0 1 and  = 0 1:
∆ =  +  + 
= 1 (11)−0 (00) (5)
Consider, for example, the decomposition ∆00, which, by taking appro-
priate terms from the three tables is given by:
∆00 = 0 (10)−0 (00)
+0 (11)−0 (10)
+1 (11)−0 (11)
= 1 (11)−0 (00) (6)
The first three rows of (6) represent, in turn, the contributions of the behav-
ioural effect, the population effect, and the tax policy effect to the overall
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change in the index. The first term in the behavioural effect cancels with
the second term in the population effect and the first term in the popula-
tion effect cancels with the second term in the tax policy effect. This leaves
the overall effect as in the last line of (6). The population effects,  en-
compass all effects other than behaviroural effects or tax structure (policy)
effects. They cover a wide range including changes in the age, occupational,
educational and demographic structure. They also include the effect of non-
uniform income growth, for instance, by occupation, sector, region or by
income source.
Following Shapley (1953) and Shorrocks (1999), the ‘marginal’ effects of
each component can be measured by their arithmetic mean values over all
possible sequences (that is, attributing the same probability to each), given
by:
¯ = 1
4
1X
=0
1X
=0
[ (1)− (0)] (7)
¯ = 1
4
1X
=0
1X
=0
[ (1)− (0)] (8)
¯ = 1
2
1X
=0
[1 ()−0 ()] (9)
The following section illustrates the approach using data and a microsimu-
lation model for Australia. However, some caution is needed in interpreting
behavioural effects obtained by using such a model. Tax microsimulation
models are partial equilibrium supply side models. Thus they are able to
simulate the effect on each individual’s labour supply of a change in the
tax structure, but they do not allow for demand-side factors or for poten-
tial general equilibrium effects on wage rates. The actual wage rate changes
thus appear as population effects. In addition, tax policy changes may affect
fertility, household formation, migration, educational choice and other vari-
ables which, in the present approach, become subsumed under the population
changes.
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3 Empirical Application: Australia 2000/01
to 2005/06
This section applies the approach described above to changes in inequality
and values of a social welfare function, based on disposable incomes in Aus-
tralia between the financial years of 2000/01 and 2005/06. The behavioural
microsimulation model used is the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer
Simulator (MITTS). This is a microsimulation model based on a structural
discrete hours approach to labour supply, with a random utility component;
for a more detailed description of MITTS, see Creedy et al. (2002) and
Creedy and Kalb (2006).
MITTS is based on the Australian Survey of Income and Housing Costs
(SIHC), a representative sample of the Australian population, containing de-
tailed information on labour supply and income from different sources, in
addition to a variety of background characteristics of individuals and house-
holds. All results are aggregated to the population level using the household
weights provided with SIHC. Pre-reform net incomes at alternative hours
levels are based on the MITTS calculation of entitlements, not the actual re-
ceipt. Furthermore, MITTS applies only income tests, as there is at present
no asset imputation in the model. All major social security payments, fam-
ily payments, rebates and income taxes are included, ensuring a reasonable
approximation to net income.
An important first question arises of how to deal with the fact that a
probability distribution over hours for each individual is generated, instead of
a single deterministic level of labour supply. Rather than using the arithmetic
mean hours for each individual, over the discrete hours available for work,
the following application uses the ‘pseudo distribution’ method proposed by
Creedy et al. (2006) for dealing with the complete distribution.
Tables 4 and 5 present the changes in the income tax rates and thresholds
and in the main benefit payments, respectively, over the period of interest.
This lists only the main benefit payments but all payments together with
the corresponding eligibility rules are used in the microsimulation model.
To uprate tax and transfer parameters, as well as incomes, to 2005/2006,
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Table 4: Income Tax Schedules 2000/01 and 2005/06
2000/01 (uprated) 2005/06
Threshold Tax rate Threshold Tax rate
0 — 7,619 0 0 — 6,000 0
7,620 — 25,395 0.17 6,001 — 21,600 0.15
25,396 — 63,488 0.30 21,601 — 63,000 0.30
63,489 — 76,186 0.42 63,001 — 95,000 0.42
76,186 0.47 95,000 0.47
a wage index based on average earnings for full-time workers, provided by
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, was used.11 The index increased by
26.98 per cent during this period. Comparison of the income tax parameters
reveals that only the second tax rate was adjusted between 2000/01 and
2005/06, decreasing by two percentage points. The adjustments in the tax
thresholds were more substantial. The first two tax thresholds were reduced
in real terms while the top tax threshold was substantially increased. These
changes in the income tax parameters amount to an increase in the average
income tax rates for (almost) all individuals on gross incomes below $86,000
a year and a decrease in taxes for incomes above this threshold.
Table 5: Changes in Main Benefit Payments Between 2000/01 and 2005/06
Change compared with wage rates:
Payment levels Taper rate
Family Tax Benefit-A 5% above Reduced
Family Tax Benefit-B 5% above Reduced
Age Pension 5% below -
Disability Support Pension 5% below -
Newstart Allowance about 5% below -
Youth Allowance 5% below -
Special Benefit 5% below -
Partner Allowance 5% below -
Family Tax Benefit-A is a transfer payment designed to deal with the
cost of raising children. The benefit withdrawal, or taper, rate for maximum
11See Australian Bureau of Statistics (cat. no. 6302.0, Table 3, series ID A2734023X).
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payment of this benefit fell from 0.3 to 0.2 over the period. Family Tax
Benefit-B is a means-tested extra payment for single parents and families
with one income earner. The taper rate for this benefit also fell from 0.3
to 0.2 over the period. Table 5 shows that while Family Benefit Payments
increased faster than the wage index, growth in the other benefit payments
fell behind that of the wage index. The use of a microsimulation model makes
it possible to examine the combined effects of all these changes in the tax
and transfer system.
Table 6: Population Size (000s) in 2000/01 and 2005/06
2000/01 2005/06 Change (per cent )
Couples 12,749 13,595 6.22
Single males 2,361 2,459 4.00
Single females 2,077 2,247 7.58
Single parents 1,559 1,531 -1.87
ALL 18,745 19,832 5.48
In combination with these two sets of tax parameters, the 2000/01 and the
2005/06 Surveys of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) were used. Changes
in population size and structure by demographic group between 2000/01
and 2005/06 are described in Table 6, although of course this is only one
aspect of the population change. The Australian population increased by
5.48 per cent over this period but population growth was not homogenous
across demographic groups. Whereas couple families and single females grew
at a faster rate, growth was slower for single males and the group of single
parents experienced a reduction in size.
The inequality measures reported below are Atkinson measures,  (), for
three values of relative inequality aversion, .12 These values cover a wide
range in view of the fact that  = 14 implies a high degree of aversion (that
is, tolerance of a very ‘leaky bucket’ in making transfers from rich to poor).
The social welfare values are for the associated abbreviated welfare function,
 = ¯ (1− ()), where ¯ is the appropriate arithmetic mean disposable
12Results were also obtained for Gini inequality measures, but are not presented here
for space reasons.
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income.13 The unit of analysis throughout is the individual, where each
individual in a household is assigned the total income per adult equivalent.
Following Banks and Johnson (1994) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994), the
adult equivalent size, , is obtained using the following parametric scales:
 = ( + ) (10)
where  and  are respectively the number of adults and children in the
unit,  is the weight attached to children and  represents the extent of
economies of scale. The weight attached to children, , was set at 06 and
the economies of scale parameter was set at  = 08.14
Table 7 shows the baseline disposable income measures, that is 0 (00),
and the total changes in inequality and social welfare between the financial
years, 2000/01 and 2005/06. This table shows that, at the aggregate level,
disposable income inequality, as measured by the Atkinson index, has de-
creased for  ≤ 08, and increased for the higher value of  = 14. At the
demographic group level the results clearly show a reduction in intra-group
inequality for couples, whereas for single males, single females and single
parents there is an increase in intra-group inequality. Both mean dispos-
able income and social welfare increased over the period for all demographic
groups except for single females who experienced a slight reduction in social
welfare. The small increase in mean disposable income was not sufficient to
compensate for the increase in inequality.
The decomposition of these changes is provided in Table 8. To limit the
size of the table, only the arithmetic mean values obtained from equations (7),
(8) and (9) are reported. All possible decompositions (at the aggregate level)
are presented in Appendix B as an illustration of the extent to which they
can vary. Table 8 presents the effects as percentages of the baseline values for
each of the three components distinguished. Hence, for each index and each
13The value of the abbreviated welfare function is thus the ‘equally distributed equiva-
lent’ level of disposable income.
14These values produce scales that are similar to the OECD scales: for values corre-
sponding to 29 different sets of equivalence scales, see Creedy and Sleeman (2005, pp.
77-79). The sensitivity of the results with respect to the economies of scale parameter is
discussed further below.
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Table 7: Baseline Disposable Income Measures and Total Changes 2000/01
to 2005/06
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples 26,609 0.0264 0.0965 0.1552 25,906 24,041 22,478
Single males 27,751 0.0299 0.1131 0.1859 26,921 24,613 22,593
Single females 23,133 0.0241 0.0904 0.1475 22,575 21,040 19,721
Single parents 18,153 0.0118 0.0442 0.0724 17,939 17,351 16,838
ALL 25,664 0.0268 0.0982 0.1580 24,977 23,144 21,610
Total percentage changes
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples 11.21 -7.34 -6.48 -5.28 11.43 11.98 12.29
Single males 5.34 11.64 8.74 7.36 4.97 4.17 3.57
Single females 0.05 11.71 7.83 5.18 -0.24 -0.73 -0.85
Single parents 10.44 48.58 40.45 34.67 9.80 8.37 7.45
ALL 9.42 -0.26 -0.03 0.66 9.42 9.42 9.28
demographic group, the sum of the behavioural effects, ¯, the population
effects, ¯ , and the policy effects, ¯ , is equal to the total changes reported
in Table 7. This means, for example, that the policy effects indicate by how
many percentage points each index would have changed between 2000/01
and 2005/06 if the tax structure were the only thing to have changed during
this period.
To illustrate, consider the case of single males, for whom Atkinson’s in-
equality measure, for  = 02, was 0.0299 in 2000/01. This increased by
11.64 per cent between 2000/01 and 2005/06. Although the arithmetic mean
disposable income increased by 5.34 per cent, social welfare increased only
by 4.97 per cent due to the increase in inequality.15 If only the popula-
tion structure had changed, inequality would have increased by 7.42 per
cent while social welfare would have increased by 6.71 per cent. If only
the tax structure had changed, inequality would have increased by 4.79 per
cent, and when combined with the reduction in mean disposable income of
15The percentage change in  is the percentage change in mean disposable income
minus the product of (1−) and the percentage change in .
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1.94 per cent, social welfare would have fallen by 2.09 per cent. Finally,
the changes attributed to the change in labour supply alone are very small.
These imply a reduction in inequality by 0.57 per cent which, combined with
an increase in arithmetic mean disposable income of 0.33 per cent, implies
an increase in social welfare of 0.35 per cent. The three components of the
change in inequality, for this aversion parameter, add to the total change of
1164 = −057 + 742 + 479. In view of the fact that all three components
were obtained ‘independently’, the finding that they sum to the computed
change in inequality also demonstrates that the assumption of ‘homogeneity’
for the tax structure, mentioned earlier, does actually hold.16
The results show that population effects account for most of the over-
all increase in social welfare at the aggregate level over this period. These
population effects are the basis of a substantial increase in average dispos-
able incomes accompanied by a limited increase in inequality. As mentioned
above, these population effects cover a wide range so that it is not possible
to attribute their contributions more precisely to any particular factor. By
contrast, the decomposition allows a more precise determination of the con-
tribution of tax policy changes and the induced labour supply adjustments.
At the aggregate level, the results show that the changes in the tax and
transfer system had barely any effect on inequality and a very small nega-
tive impact on mean disposable incomes. Behavioural effects contributed to
a small increase in mean disposable incomes and to a reduction in inequal-
ity. This is consistent with labour supply responses to the policy changes
inducing larger labour supply increases for low-income than for high-income
households. Appendix C reports labour supply responses if a change from
the 2000/01 to the 2005/06 tax structure is imposed on the 2000/01 popu-
lation. It is shown that the proportions making a positive change in labour
supply is higher for the lower deciles, with a higher proportion of individuals
reducing labour supply in the higher income groups.
The results reveal a large degree of heterogeneity at the demographic
16Values are reported to only two decimal places so that, as a result of rounding, in
some cases the sum of components in Table 8 are very slightly different from the changes
in Table 7.
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Table 8: Average Effects as Per Cent of Baseline: Disposable Income Mea-
sures
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples ¯ 0.07 -0.44 -0.61 -0.75 0.08 0.14 0.22
¯ 11.28 -5.11 -3.94 -2.61 11.43 11.76 11.83
¯ -0.13 -1.79 -1.94 -1.92 -0.08 0.09 0.24
Single males ¯ 0.33 -0.57 -0.54 -0.49 0.35 0.40 0.44
¯ 6.95 7.42 4.53 3.14 6.71 6.32 6.16
¯ -1.94 4.79 4.75 4.70 -2.09 -2.56 -3.03
Single females ¯ 0.37 -0.22 -0.15 -0.08 0.37 0.38 0.38
¯ 2.06 7.07 3.31 0.78 1.89 1.73 1.92
¯ -2.39 4.86 4.66 4.47 -2.50 -2.84 -3.15
Single parents ¯ -0.30 1.44 1.27 1.10 -0.32 -0.36 -0.39
¯ 10.89 49.72 42.10 36.71 10.24 8.74 7.73
¯ -0.15 -2.57 -2.92 -3.14 -0.12 -0.01 0.11
ALL ¯ 0.11 -0.33 -0.42 -0.50 0.12 0.16 0.21
¯ 9.91 0.14 0.47 1.13 9.90 9.85 9.68
¯ -0.61 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 -0.60 -0.60 -0.61
Note: ¯ is the behavioural component
¯ is the population component
¯ is the tax policy component
group level. While population changes are overwhelmingly the main contrib-
utors to the increase in social welfare for couples and single parents, policy
changes play a substantial role for single males and females.17 The popula-
tion effects contributed to a very large increase in inequality among single
parents. This increase is between 36.7 and 49.7 percentage points depending
on the aversion for inequality. This result should be contrasted with the
particularly low initial level of intra-group inequality for single parents (and
the relatively small size of this group).
For both single males and females, tax policy changes had a negative effect
on disposable income and they increased inequality. For single females, the
negative effects of tax policy changes more than offset the positive effects of
17The point made earlier, that some (non-labour supply and general equilibrium) tax
effects appear in population effects, should also be kept in mind.
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the changing structure of the population, resulting in a reduction in social
welfare. The negative policy effects for singles reflects, to some extent, the
regressive changes in income taxes discussed above. For couples and single
parents, this effect would have been somewhat offset by the increased levels
of family benefit payments which are largely means tested.
The behavioural responses to these policy changes rarely work in the
same directions as the tax policy effects . For couples, single males and
single females, behavioural effects contributed to a slight increase in social
welfare through a combination of a reduction in intra-group inequality and
an increase in average disposable incomes. Again, this is consistent with
an overall increase in labour supply more concentrated at the low-end than
at the high-end of the income distribution. By contrast, behavioural effects
reduced disposable incomes and increased intra-group inequality for single
parents and thus had a negative effect on social welfare. Hence, for single
parents, the results point toward a reduction in labour supply which was
more pronounced for low-income than for high-income single parents. These
results clearly demonstrate the value of the decomposition, allied with a
behavioural microsimulation model, for understanding changes over time.
Jenkins and Cowell (1994) showed that the effect on inequality of changing
the scale economy parameter, , in the adult equivalence scales cannot be
predicted a priori.18 In the present context, a reduction in  from 08 to 04
was found to increase absolute inequality levels but had little effect on the
percentage changes and the decompositions reported above. However, at the
aggregate level, the population effects on inequality were found to be larger
than with  = 08, resulting in a clear increase in overall inequality between
the two periods for all three values of  (instead of only a small increase for
 = 14 with  = 08).
18Profiles of inquality plotted against  can be U-shaped or reverse J-shaped, the turning
point depending on the correlation between adult equivalent income and household size:
see Jenkins and Cowell (1994) and Creedy and Sleeman (2005). Hence, inequality can
decrease or increase when  is increased.
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4 Allowing for Leisure
The use of disposable income in inequality and social welfare measures, as in
the previous section, can be described as a ‘non-welfarist’ approach. It con-
centrates on interpersonal comparisons of disposable income. Some judges
may take the view that an allowance should be made for leisure. In the
standard optimal tax literature, this is achieved using a ‘welfarist’ approach
whereby the social evaluation is based on a particular cardinalisation of each
individual’s utility, instead of simply their disposable income. The evalua-
tion function used is typically an additive individualistic Paretean welfare
function defined in terms of individuals’ utilities and satisfying the principle
of transfers (usually with an assumption of constant relative inequality aver-
sion). Hence, if for example the Atkinson inequality measure is used, it is
the same kind of welfare function that is used in the above comparisons, but
uses utility instead of disposable income as the ‘welfare metric’. This kind
of cardinalisation, allowing inter-personal comparisons, raises relatively few
problems in view of the fact that the vast majority of simple optimal tax
models make an assumption of common preferences. Indeed, the only type
of heterogeneity introduced into such models usually relates to abilities, or
wage rates.
The use of a behavioural microsimulation model based on a cross-sectional
survey of households is, however, motivated by a desire to allow for as much
population heterogeneity as possible. A model which accurately reflects the
variation in circumstances and tastes found in practice can provide the kind
of information that can be used in rational policy debate. However, as men-
tioned earlier it is known that the use of a welfare metric based on a cardi-
nalisation of individual utility is problematic when preferences differ. This
section proposes a non-welfarist approach as a modification of the treatment
of disposable income, by allowing for the joint values of disposable income
and leisure.
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4.1 A Non-welfarist Approach
As mentioned in the introduction, one approach used to deal with aggre-
gation problems with heterogeneous preferences was taken by Aaberge and
Colombino (2008). They based labour supply behaviour on a discrete hours
structural approach, allowing for preference heterogeneity and a random util-
ity component, as in the MITTS model used here. But in examining social
welfare functions, they used a welfare metric based on re-estimating the pref-
erence function without the observed heterogeneity terms; that is, they ob-
tained a ‘common’ preference function. However, the use of an estimated
‘common’ preference function, or ‘reference preference ordering’ (different
from those used to model behaviour) is just one possible approach to con-
structing the welfare metric for each individual.
An alternative approach arises from recognising that the ‘reference pref-
erence function’ can be viewed as being effectively a representation of value
judgements of the independent judge, rather than any concept of utility.
Hence, it is possible simply to impose a welfare metric which involves a com-
mon evaluation or weighting function applied to all individuals. The func-
tion represents the way the judge makes cardinal interpersonal comparisons.
Since the use of social welfare functions essentially involves investigating the
implications of adopting alternative value judgements, these do not have to
be based on any type of common or estimated preference function. Indeed,
when using a social welfare function in terms of disposable income, of the
form  = P (), with  () = 1− (1− ) for inequality aversion of
 6= 1, there is no pretence that () represents a ‘common utility function’,
since it instead reflects a particular type of value judgement (such as adher-
ence to the ‘principle of transfers’, along with the choice of  as the welfare
metric).
In the previous section, the evaluation is based on disposable income, and
is made in precisely this way. If the judge is assumed to take a view about
leisure, then it is possible to use a slightly different evaluation function — one
that is a function of both disposable income and leisure. In this framework,
consider welfare functions based on, for each individual, the geometric aver-
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age value of disposable income, , and hours of work, . The social welfare
function may thus take the form:
 = 1
X
=1
© ( − )1−ª1−
1−  (11)
where  is the maximum hours of work, so that − denotes leisure over the
relevant period, for income units  = 1   , with 0 ≤  ≤ 1.19 Atkinson
inequality measures are thus based on the metric  =  ( − )1−. The
use of disposable income therefore corresponds to taking  = 1 (that is,
ignoring leisure in the evaluation).20
4.2 Empirical Application
This subsection applies the approach described above to the decomposition
of inequality and social welfare changes in Australia between the financial
years of 2000/01 and 2005/06, again using the MITTS model. The results
are contrasted with those obtained in the previous section, where leisure was
ignored. Here,  is set at 80 hours per week and the parameter , reflecting
the view of the judge regarding the importance of income versus leisure, is
set at 0.7. This is chosen for illustrative purposes only.
Table 9 presents the baseline values and total percentage changes in in-
equality and social welfare between 2000/01 and 2005/06 for this welfare
metric, . At the aggregate level, the results show that when the judge takes
a view about leisure, the increase in social welfare over the period is almost
halved (compared with results in Table 7 which uses ) and inequality un-
ambiguously increases. This indicates that the increase in the social welfare
function based on disposable income measures was influenced to a substantial
19Alternatively, some judges may evaluate a policy change according to whether it in-
creases the labour supply of certain groups, so that increases in leisure would be considered
‘bad’.
20The welfare function here, in which aggregation over ‘attributes’ involves a weighted
geometric mean, differs slightly from the approach of Seth (2012) which uses a generalised
mean for each stage of aggregation, in the context of multidimensional welfare indices.
Both approaches use, in the terminology of Pattanaik et al. (2007), ‘row-first two-stage
aggregation’, which ensures that the index is ‘association sensitive’ (that is, it is concerned
with the correlation between attributes).
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Table 9: Baseline for Welfare Metric and Total Changes 2000/01 to 2005/06:
Alpha=0.7
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples 4,162 0.0104 0.0390 0.0646 4,119 3,999 3,893
Single males 4,010 0.0103 0.0390 0.0649 3,969 3,854 3,750
Single females 3,688 0.0071 0.0273 0.0458 3,662 3,587 3,519
Single parents 3,405 0.0043 0.0166 0.0278 3,390 3,348 3,310
ALL 4,027 0.0100 0.0374 0.0618 3,987 3,877 3,778
Total percentage changes: welfare metric with  = 07
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples 5.99 -5.80 -5.15 -4.35 6.05 6.21 6.31
Single males 1.19 6.91 6.21 5.85 1.12 0.93 0.78
Single females -0.28 16.39 12.45 9.53 -0.39 -0.63 -0.73
Single parents 5.69 49.59 43.71 39.01 5.47 4.92 4.52
ALL 4.82 1.19 1.49 1.94 4.81 4.76 4.69
extent by its neglect of an increase in hours of work, and thus a reduction
in leisure time. At the demographic group level, changes in social welfare
are also reduced by the use of the allowance for leisure in the ‘non-welfarist’
evaluation, but the direction of the changes remains unchanged. In particu-
lar, the increase in social welfare for single males is reduced to 1.12 per cent
for  = 02 and 0.78 for  = 12, while it was 4.97 and 3.57 per cent for  of
02 and 14 respectively with disposable income measures.
The decomposition of these changes is presented in Table 10. Population
effects remain the main contributors to the overall changes in social welfare
at the population level and also for couples and single parents, as was the
case with disposable income measures. For single females, the negative policy
effects more than offset the positive population effects, as in previous results.
For single males, policy changes now offset most of the increase in social wel-
fare due to population changes, which explains the reduced increase in social
welfare mentioned above. Table 10 also reveals that behavioural effects are
reduced once the judge takes a view about leisure. Indeed, the contributions
of behavioural effects to disposable income changes are necessarily offset, to
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Table 10: Average Effects as Per Cent of Baseline: Welfare Metric with
Alpha=0.7
Atkinson index Social welfare
¯  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples ¯ 0.03 -0.55 -0.65 -0.75 0.04 0.06 0.09
¯ 5.95 -3.56 -2.79 -1.95 5.99 6.07 6.09
¯ 0.01 -1.68 -1.71 -1.65 0.03 0.08 0.13
Single males ¯ 0.14 -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 0.14 0.15 0.16
¯ 2.62 1.38 0.58 0.11 2.60 2.59 2.61
¯ -1.57 5.93 6.02 6.11 -1.63 -1.81 -1.99
Single females ¯ 0.15 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16
¯ 1.43 10.48 6.62 3.76 1.36 1.25 1.25
¯ -1.86 6.13 6.01 5.93 -1.90 -2.03 -2.14
Single parents ¯ -0.20 1.09 0.98 0.86 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22
¯ 5.93 51.28 45.70 41.23 5.70 5.12 4.69
¯ -0.04 -2.78 -2.97 -3.09 -0.03 0.01 0.05
ALL ¯ 0.04 -0.42 -0.48 -0.54 0.05 0.06 0.08
¯ 5.16 1.18 1.48 1.86 5.15 5.10 5.03
¯ -0.38 0.42 0.49 0.62 -0.39 -0.40 -0.42
Note: ¯ is the behavioural component
¯ is the population component
¯ is the tax policy component
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some extent, by the corresponding changes in leisure time, whether labour
supply responses are positive or negative.
5 Money Metric Utility
The acknowledged problems, when preferences differ, of using a welfare met-
ric based on a cardinalisation of individual utilities has beenmentioned above.
It is nevertheless worth considering the use, for comparison purposes, of
‘money metric utility’, especially as it continues to be used in some applied
studies. The use of a welfare change measure in a ‘welfarist’ evaluation
means that the decomposition method needs to be modified, as there are
fewer counterfactual changes. This is because money metric utility is defined
in terms of ‘reference prices’ (including wages), which are held constant at the
base period values so that the end period value is obtained from the welfare
change involved. This cannot be separated from the behavioural change in
the way that is possible when disposable income is used. The first subsection
describes a decomposition method for money metric utility, which is applied
in the second subsection below.
5.1 Methodology
This section considers the decomposition of inequality changes in the case
where the welfare metric is money metric utility, , with reference prices set
at period 0’s tax structure. Define  () as the inequality index based
on the distribution of money metric utility, for period ’s tax structure using
the population dataset of period .
Using period 0 as reference prices, the value of 00 is simply given by
full income in period 0. This is defined as the net income which could be
obtained if all the endowment of time were devoted to work at the going gross
wage rate. For each income unit, the net income at the assumed maximum
number of hours per week by all adult members of the income unit under
period 0’s tax structure is calculated, giving full income for the income unit.
The term (10) refers to the inequality measure based on money met-
ric utility for each individual in dataset 0 after the tax change; this is the
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value of full income, 00 minus the equivalent variation,  , arising from
the tax change; see Creedy, Hérault and Kalb (2011) and references cited
therein.
In using money metric utility, a separate behavioural effect cannot be
isolated in the way it can be separated for the use of disposable income. In
that case, gross income, arising from one tax structure, could have a different
tax structure applied in order to get disposable income. This is not possible
when using money metric utility.
The term  (11) is the inequality index based on the distribution of
money metric utility in period 1, for population dataset 1. Hence to obtain
this, it is necessary first to compute full income for each individual in popu-
lation dataset 1, using the tax structure (appropriately scaled) of period 0,
to get the appropriate full income. Then 11 is obtained as that full income
less the  from the shift to tax structure 1 (for the same population). How-
ever, computationally it is most convenient (given the calibration approach
to microsimulation adopted here) to use the fact that the  for a given
tax change is the negative of the compensating variation for the opposite tax
change.
Consider changes arising from the tax structure change between periods
0 and 1. There are two changes arising from the tax policy effects alone,
depending on whether dataset 0 or 1 is used. These are:
0 = (10)− (00) (12)
1 = (11)− (01) (13)
for datasets 0 and 1 respectively.
Similarly, there are two decompositions of the population effect, depend-
ing on the tax structure used as base. These are:
0 = (11)− (10) (14)
1 = (01)− (00) (15)
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There are thus two decompositions of the overall change, given by:
∆0 = 0 + 0
= { (10)− (00)}+ { (11)− (10)}
=  (11)− (00) (16)
and:
∆1 = 1 + 1
= { (11)− (01)}+ { (01)− (00)}
=  (11)− (00) (17)
The average values of the separate components can thus be obtained as ¯ =
(0 + 1) 2 and ¯ = (0 + 1) 2.
Implementation of this approach requires the calculation of welfare changes,
and hence money metric utilities, in the context of a discrete hours approach
with a random utility component. The following analysis uses the approach
proposed by Creedy, Hérault and Kalb (2011). The assumed maximum num-
ber of hours per week was again set at 80 hours of work.
5.2 Empirical Application
In line with the previous applications, this section applies the decomposi-
tion based on money metric utility to inequality and social welfare changes
in Australia between 2000/01 and 2005/06. Baseline money metric values
and total percentage changes are presented in Table 11. The corresponding
decompositions are presented in Table 12.
At the aggregate level, the increase in social welfare observed in the previ-
ous section is further reduced and the increase in inequality is larger. At the
demographic group level, only couples are judged to experience an increase in
social welfare, while for all other groups there is a decrease in social welfare
(except for a small increase for single parents for  = 02). Population effects
remain the main contributors to the total changes in social welfare for couples
and single parents. An important difference from previous results is that, for
single males and single females, tax policy and behavioural effects reinforce,
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Table 11: Baseline Money Metric Measures and Changes 2000/01 to 2005/06
Atkinson index Social welfare
Mean  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples 56,880 0.0159 0.0569 0.0916 55,978 53,643 51,670
Single males 56,527 0.0115 0.0444 0.0759 55,876 54,017 52,236
Single females 51,489 0.0095 0.0365 0.0622 50,999 49,611 48,284
Single parents 39,615 0.0103 0.0393 0.0655 39,206 38,058 37,020
ALL 54,802 0.0151 0.0552 0.0902 53,973 51,776 49,860
Total percentage changes
Atkinson index Social Welfare
Mean  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples 3.32 -7.95 -4.60 -2.61 3.45 3.60 3.59
Single males -0.08 74.35 46.37 32.32 -0.94 -2.23 -2.73
Single females -3.06 4.45 2.93 0.91 -3.10 -3.17 -3.12
Single parents 0.61 41.72 37.60 34.06 0.17 -0.93 -1.79
ALL 2.22 4.55 4.81 5.02 2.15 1.94 1.72
Table 12: Average Effects as Per Cent of Baseline: Money Metric Measure
Atkinson index Social welfare
Mean  = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
Couples ¯ 3.38 -6.49 -2.86 -0.67 3.49 3.56 3.45
¯ -0.06 -1.46 -1.73 -1.93 -0.04 0.05 0.14
Single males ¯ 0.88 71.08 43.26 29.18 0.04 -1.14 -1.53
¯ -0.95 3.27 3.11 3.14 -0.99 -1.09 -1.20
Single females ¯ -1.99 2.28 0.69 -1.55 -2.01 -2.01 -1.88
¯ -1.07 2.17 2.24 2.46 -1.09 -1.16 -1.23
Single parents ¯ 0.69 45.14 41.19 37.75 0.21 -1.01 -1.98
¯ -0.07 -3.42 -3.59 -3.69 -0.04 0.08 0.19
ALL ¯ 2.51 5.19 5.64 5.96 2.43 2.17 1.90
¯ -0.28 -0.64 -0.83 -0.94 -0.27 -0.23 -0.19
Note: ¯ is the population component
¯ is the tax policy component
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rather than offset, population effects. The consequence is that the reduction
in social welfare previously observed for single females is reinforced, while
the increase in social welfare for single males is turned into a clear reduction.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined, with a behavioural tax microsimulation model,
changes in inequality, and the value of its associated social welfare function,
using cross-sectional survey data for two years. The aim was to identify the
separate contributions of population, tax policy and behavioural effects to
the total changes observed over a given period of time. In using a discrete
hours structural model, in which there is an additive random component
to utility, a distribution of hours worked is generated for each individual.
Instead of using each individual’s arithmetic mean hours of work, the ‘pseudo
distribution’ method proposed by Creedy et al. (2006) was used to obtain
a close approximation of the full distribution. In addition, the analysis was
complemented by the development of two alternative approaches designed
to go beyond net income measures and to account for leisure. The first
approach, based on disposable incomes, is ‘non-welfarist’ in that evaluations
are made in terms of a welfare metric which is not expressed in terms of each
individual’s utility. However, it allows the independent judge to attach some
value to leisure. The second approach is described as ‘welfarist’ in that it is
based on money metric utility.
The two non-welfarist approaches and one welfarist decomposition ap-
proach were presented and applied to Australia over the period 2000/01 to
2005/06, using the behavioural microsimulation model, MITTS.
Where social welfare was obtained using disposable income as the welfare
metric, the changes were decomposed into behavioural, population (broadly
defined) and tax policy changes. The application to Australia revealed that
changes in inequality were small in aggregate, but social welfare increased
by about 9 per cent. Most of the change was attributed to changes in the
structure of the population. However, for separate demographic groups, a
wider range of results were obtained, with single parents in particular expe-
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riencing the largest change in inequality, and with behavioural effects having
an inequality-increasing influence. For single males and single females, pol-
icy effects were found to be substantial, with a negative impact on social
welfare, which offset to a large extent the positive population effects. The
policy-induced behavioural changes were generally found to act in the oppo-
site direction from the direct effects of the policy changes.
The decomposition method was then extended to allow for a further non-
welfarist social welfare function in which the independent judge attaches
some value to leisure as well as disposable income. In this approach, a wel-
fare metric was proposed that is equivalent to a weighted geometric mean
of disposable income and leisure. Compared with the absence of any regard
for leisure by the judge, this was generally found to involve larger percent-
age increases in inequality and smaller increases in social welfare. Hence,
although social welfare based on disposable income had increased over the
period, this was partly offset when the associated increase in hours of work
(and the corresponding reduction in leisure time) was accounted for by the
judge.
Finally, the decomposition method was adapted to deal with the use of
money metric utility as the welfare metric in the social welfare function. In
this case a separate behavioural effect could not be isolated. The value of
money metric utility for each individual was obtained using full income values
for the initial period and equivalent variations resulting from the tax changes.
The empirical results contrasted quite substantially with those obtained for
the non-welfarist approaches, particularly for single males where inequality
changes were largely above those obtained with the non-welfarist approaches.
The analysis has demonstrated the value of a behavioural microsimula-
tion model in gaining a more detailed appreciation of the factors contributing
to measured changes in inequality between two periods. Non-welfarist eval-
uations, either in terms of disposable incomes or some weighted average of
disposable income and leisure, can be carried out, given a model that is ca-
pable of generating the various counterfactuals required. Furthermore, the
choice of welfare metric was found to be important in evaluating changes.
Further investigation of methods of carrying out welfarist evaluations in the
29
presence of preference heterogeneity seems warranted.
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Appendix A: MITTS - The Melbourne Insti-
tute Tax and Transfer Simulator
This appendix provides a brief description of the Melbourne Institute Tax
and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), a behavioural microsimulation model of
direct tax and transfers in Australia. Since the first version was completed
in 2000, and described in Creedy et al. (2002), it has undergone a range of
substantial developments; For an overview of refereed publications and books
relating to the MITTS model, see:
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/labour/microsimulation/MITTS-publications.html.
MITTS consists of two components. MITTS-A is the arithmetic tax and
benefit modelling component and provides, using the wage rate of each indi-
vidual, the budget constraints that are crucial for the analysis of behavioural
responses to tax changes. For those individuals in the data set who are not
working, an imputed wage is obtained. MITTS-B examines the effects of any
specified tax reform, allowing individuals to adjust their labour supply. Be-
haviour is based on quadratic preference functions where the parameters are
allowed to vary with individuals’ characteristics. Individuals are considered
as being constrained to select from a discrete set of hours levels. For singles,
11 discrete points are distinguished. For couples, a joint set of discrete labour
supply points are used. The female hours distribution covers a wider range
of part-time and full-time hours than the male distribution, which is mostly
divided between non-participation and full-time work. Therefore, women’s
labour supply is divided into 11 discrete points, whereas men’s labour sup-
ply is represented by just 6 points. The joint labour supply of couples is
estimated simultaneously, unlike a popular approach in which female labour
supply is estimated with the spouse’s labour supply taken as exogenous. Thus
for couples there are 66 possible joint labour supply combinations.
Simulations are probabilistic, as utility at each hours level is the sum of a
deterministic component (depending on hours worked and net income) and a
random component. Hence MITTS generates a probability distribution over
the discrete hours levels. The self-employed, disabled, students and those
over 65 have their labour supply fixed at observed hours. Simulations begin
31
by recording the discrete hours level for each individual that is closest to the
observed hours level. The deterministic component of utility is obtained using
the parameter estimates of the quadratic preference function. To generate
the random component, a draw is taken from the distribution of the error
term for each hours level (an Extreme Value Type I distribution). The utility-
maximising hours level is found by adding the two components of utility for
each hours level and choosing the hours with the highest utility. Draws from
the error terms are taken conditionally on the observed labour supply; that
is, they are taken in such a way that the optimal pre-reform labour supply is
equal to the actually observed labour supply. As a result, post-reform labour
supply is simulated conditional on the observed pre-reform labour supply. A
user-specified number of draws is produced.
For the post-reform analysis, the new net incomes cause the deterministic
component of utility at each hours level to change, so using the same set
of draws from the calibration stage, a new set of optimal hours of work is
produced. This gives rise to a probability distribution over the set of discrete
hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer structure.
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Appendix B: Further Details of Decomposi-
tions
Table 13 reports, for the population as a whole, the various decompositions
of changes in the distribution of disposable income. The table illustrates the
wide variations which can arise for the different decompositions. In some
cases there are differences in the direction of changes.
Table 13: All Decompositions: Disposable Income 2000/01 to 2005/06
Mean Atkinson index Social welfare
 = 02  = 08  = 14  = 02  = 08  = 14
1(11)−0(00) 9.42 -0.26 -0.03 0.66 9.42 9.42 9.28
Behavioural effects
0(10)−0(00) 0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.19 0.05 0.06 0.09
1(10)−1(00) 0.13 -0.24 -0.36 -0.46 0.14 0.17 0.22
0(11)−0(01) 0.09 -0.42 -0.49 -0.52 0.11 0.15 0.19
1(11)−1(01) 0.16 -0.64 -0.73 -0.79 0.18 0.24 0.31
Average 0.11 -0.33 -0.42 -0.49 0.12 0.15 0.20
Population effects
0(11)−0(10) 9.96 -0.15 0.27 1.02 9.97 9.93 9.75
1(11)−1(10) 9.94 0.02 0.30 0.91 9.94 9.91 9.76
0(01)−0(00) 9.91 0.26 0.65 1.35 9.91 9.84 9.64
1(01)−1(00) 9.91 0.43 0.68 1.24 9.90 9.83 9.65
Average 9.93 0.14 0.47 1.13 9.93 9.88 9.70
Policy effects
1(11)−0(11) -0.55 -0.10 -0.19 -0.16 -0.54 -0.53 -0.52
1(00)−0(00) -0.61 -0.04 0.02 0.22 -0.61 -0.61 -0.65
Average -0.58 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 -0.58 -0.57 -0.58
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Appendix C: Labour Supply Responses
As an example of labour supply responses, Table 14 shows, for males and fe-
males, the percentage changes in hours worked per week. These are obtained
for changes from the 2000/01 to the 2005/06 tax structure, imposed on the
2000/01 population. The changes are given for deciles of the distribution of
net income unit income per adult equivalent under the baseline.
Table 14: Labour Supply Responses: Tax Change Imposed on 2000/01 Pop-
ulation
Decile Females Males
Negative Zero Positive Negative Zero Positive
1 0.1 70.5 29.4 0.2 64.0 35.8
2 0.0 91.0 9.0 0.3 85.3 14.4
3 0.6 79.6 19.7 5.6 72.0 22.4
4 5.5 61.6 32.9 12.5 60.5 27.0
5 12.6 65.0 22.4 16.4 66.9 16.7
6 25.6 55.2 19.2 21.5 60.4 18.1
7 29.1 52.0 18.9 24.6 58.5 16.9
8 32.6 48.3 19.0 27.0 53.9 19.1
9 36.2 47.9 15.9 34.0 47.7 18.3
10 33.6 41.7 24.8 28.5 45.5 26.0
TOTAL 17.1 61.7 21.1 18.2 60.0 21.8
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